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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [NATO](#) [KNNP](#) [KACT](#) [GM](#)  
SUBJECT: GERMANY: CAMPAIGN AGAINST NON-STRATEGIC NUKES TO  
CONTINUE; SUPPORTS CFE CONCESSIONS

Classified By: Pol M/C George Glass for reasons 1.4 (b/d)

11. (C) Summary. On November 10 MFA Arms Control Chief Peter Gottwald told the Ambassador that Germany would continue to engage with Belgium and the Netherlands in advance of a broader NATO discussion over the removal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from Germany. Gottwald insisted that tactical nukes in Germany were of no practical value and that, if efforts through NATO stalled, FM Westerwelle might feel pressed to nudge the process along via public comments. On CFE, Gottwald said Russia was no longer willing to make major concessions to secure full ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. In order to make progress, he called on NATO to reconsider CFE cornerstones such as the Istanbul Commitments. Specifically, Gottwald said Germany would continue to insist on "core elements" of the Istanbul Commitments but would support breaking any direct linkage between these and A/CFE ratification. End summary.

#### NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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12. (C) Gottwald insisted that Germany was not "on a missionary campaign" against non-strategic nuclear weapons and was not pushing others in Europe to remove these from their territory. Moreover, Germany did not want to undermine NATO solidarity with regards to Article 5; however, Gottwald said that, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, it was increasingly difficult to justify Germany's nuclear share to the general public. He claimed that all political parties were willing to pursue a removal of nuclear weapons from Germany but reiterated that officials would press for this within NATO and not act unilaterally.

13. (C) Gottwald said FM Westerwelle's first talks in Washington regarding NSNW had gone very well, but that the MFA recognized the need to also broach the issue repeatedly with other allies. He predicted that Turkey might be most averse to Germany's push, but believed that Belgium and the Netherlands would be sympathetic -- though Gottwald said he did not expect these to be at the forefront. Germany, he said, would continue discussions with Dutch and Belgian officials as well as undertake talks with Poland -- which could feel particularly affected by the removal of NSNW from Germany. Within NATO, Germany would push to revisit the issue of Europe-based nuclear forces in the new NATO Strategic Concept.

#### GERMANY'S WAY FORWARD ON CFE TREATY

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14. (C) Gottwald re-emphasized that Germany wants to regain traction on the CFE treaty which, he complained, had been stagnant for a decade and severely undermined by Russia's near two-year suspension of information exchange. In order

to kick-start the process, Gottwald said NATO should reconsider the traditional cornerstones of our CFE negotiations -- specifically with regard to Russia's implementation of its Istanbul commitments. For its part, Germany would continue to insist on "core elements" of the Istanbul Commitments -- Gottwald did not specify which ones -- but would stop linking these to ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. Gottwald emphasized that Germany had, so far, only discussed its revised approach with USG officials.

15. (C) Germany wants to see successful U.S.-Russian negotiations on a post-START agreement this December in hopes that it could spur progress on CFE. Gottwald said that we should press Russia to show some good will by resuming its information exchange responsibilities. In return, he said the allies could offer Russia a discussion to define the term "substantial combat forces" in the Adapted CFE Treaty. Gottwald told us that Germany is allowing for a reflection time on its proposed way forward but plans to start engaging more actively in December.

16. (C) Gottwald was disappointed that Germany was not able to build much momentum behind CFE after the MFA-organized conference in June. He reminded us that Germany has organized an experts meeting in late November to keep the discussion going and exchange thoughts on key issues such as the CFE flank regime.

COMMENT

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17. (C) Gottwald's assertion that "all" political parties

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would pursue the removal of nuclear assets from German soil glosses over the fact that Chancellor Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has been a traditional proponent of Germany's nuclear share. Nevertheless, CDU politicians have been notably quiet on this front -- first, out of caution about supporting a policy that could be changed in the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review and secondly, on the expectation that NATO allies -- most notably the U.S. -- will eventually pull FM Westermarle back into line, assuming the current policy remains unchanged. In that sense, Gottwald's point is correct since, for now, politicians are aligning into two camps: those actively opposed to the continued deployment of nuclear weapons in Germany, believing that the winds of change are blowing their way, and those willing to stay clear of the debate in hopes that outside forces will intervene. End comment.

MURPHY